Presidential Succession: The Art of the Possible by Fleming, James E.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 3 Article 9 
2010 
Presidential Succession: The Art of the Possible 
James E. Fleming 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James E. Fleming, Presidential Succession: The Art of the Possible, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 951 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss3/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 951 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:   
THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE 
 
James E. Fleming* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am deeply honored that John D. Feerick invited me to come back to 
Fordham University School of Law and appear in this splendid conference.  
Yet I hasten to say that, when it comes to presidential succession, John 
Feerick and Joel K. Goldstein are tough acts to follow.  Indeed, in an 
otherwise wonderfully organized conference, the line of succession here is 
flawed.  I suppose I should declare myself unqualified to follow these 
experts on presidential succession!  I shall bring the perspective of the 
constitutional theory generalist to bear on the questions framed for our 
panel. 
In thinking about the adequacy of the presidential succession system in 
the twenty-first century, we might take either of two routes:  (1) try to 
design an ideal system, given the kinds of problems we can imagine, and 
given our basic constitutional commitments and aspirations, or (2) attempt 
to work with the system we have, tweaking it in politically feasible ways to 
make it better, given an understanding of politics as the art of the possible.  
If I were to take the first approach, I could hardly do better than the 
Continuity of Government Commission has done in its Second Report.1  I 
would simply move for the adoption of their recommendations.  I suppose, 
though, that doing so would make for a boring paper—even if John C. 
Fortier and Norman J. Ornstein, both on the Commission and here at the 
conference, would find it gratifying. 
Instead, I am going to take the second approach.  I shall put on my 
political scientist hat and think about what is politically feasible from where 
we sit.  In thinking about feasible reforms, we must begin with the sobering 
reality that a people who did not abolish or amend the Electoral College 
after the Bush-Gore presidential election controversy is not likely to adopt 
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recommendations like those in the Continuity of Government Commission 
Report.  We got the Twenty-Fifth Amendment only after the assassination 
of President John F. Kennedy, itself after a previous elderly President 
Dwight Eisenhower had serious medical problems while in office.2  We got 
the Twenty-Second Amendment only after President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt was elected to four terms.3  We got the Presidential Succession 
Act of 1947 only after that same President died in office, early in his fourth 
term.4  And only after his successor, Harry S. Truman, lost control of both 
houses of Congress in the 1946 elections.5  And so, I fear that we are not 
likely to adopt sound and sensible recommendations like those in the 
Continuity of Government Commission Report until after a national 
catastrophe like those chillingly hypothesized in the opening pages of the 
Report.6 
Our panel is to consider “the adequacy of current succession law in light 
of the Constitution and policy considerations.”  I interpret “current 
succession law” to include both the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947.7  As for the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, which has been widely commended, I believe it is perfectly 
adequate in doing what it set out to do.  It does not resolve every 
conceivable problem, nor does it purport to do so.  But what it addresses, it 
handles quite well. 
As for the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, which has been widely 
criticized, I am going to play devil’s advocate and defend it.  I hasten to add 
that I am going to give only one and a half cheers for it as of 2010, though I 
would have given two cheers for it in 1947.  First, I shall defend it from a 
constitutional standpoint:  both from a particular reading of who may be an 
“Officer” within the meaning of the Succession Clause of Article II, Section 
1of the Constitution and from a general conception of separation of powers 
principles.  Second, I shall defend it from the standpoint of policy.  I shall 
present President Truman’s policy arguments in support of the Act and 
acknowledge the good in them.  But, like Goldstein, I will point to changes 
in our politics since 1947 that somewhat undercut the wisdom of Truman’s 
arguments.8 
I.  ONE AND A HALF CHEERS FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT OF 
1947 
The literature on presidential succession has not been kind to the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947:  most commentators argue that it is 
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both unconstitutional and unwise as a matter of policy.9  Before assessing 
the Act’s constitutionality, I want to distinguish two competing general 
approaches to separation of powers questions.  One is formalist, categorical, 
and hermetic.10  The other is functionalist, flexible, and pragmatic.11  In 
recent years, the former approach has been highly vocal, and we see it most 
clearly in Justice Scalia’s separation of powers jurisprudence and that of his 
acolytes, including Professor Steven G. Calabresi.12  Those who take this 
approach find the very idea of legislative succession to the Presidency 
repugnant to their formalist, hermetic vision.13  It is also a pox on their 
grand conception of a unitary executive.14 
By contrast, I take a pragmatic, flexible approach to separation of powers 
generally, and so I accord a great deal of deference to practical 
arrangements worked out by the President and Congress.  I believe, with 
Richard E. Neustadt and most political scientists, that we do not have a 
system of pure “separation of powers,” but instead a system of “separated 
institutions sharing powers.”15  I am opposed to importing grand normative 
theories of the formalist separation of powers and the unitary executive and 
imposing them upon such practical arrangements as presidential succession 
(or, for that matter, legislative vetoes,16 line item vetoes,17 and the like).  In 
recent years, I believe, the formalist approach has done great damage to the 
workings of our political system, and it has underestimated the pragmatic 
complexities of the workings of the modern administrative state.  This 
approach underpins many arguments against the constitutionality of the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947. 
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& Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 993 (2004); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Principles and Presidential 
Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345 (2001). 
 10. See, for example, Justice Hugo L. Black’s opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger’s opinion of the Court in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Chief Justice Burger’s 
opinion of the Court in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); and Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinions in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) and Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413–27 (1989). 
 11. See, for example, Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 634–55; Chief Justice Burger’s opinion of the Court in United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974); Justice Byron R. White’s dissents in Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967–1013, 
and Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759–76; Justice Harold A. Blackmun’s opinion of the Court in 
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361; and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 469–97 (1998). 
 12. See Calabresi, supra note 9, at 163–66. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary 
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995). 
 15. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 29 
(1990). 
 16. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (declaring legislative veto unconstitutional). 
 17. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446–49 (1998) (declaring line item veto 
unconstitutional). 
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By contrast, I develop my pragmatic, flexible approach to separation of 
powers from what our practice has been, not from grand, normative 
formalist conceptions from on high.  And I accord considerable deference 
concerning the constitutionality of practices, like legislative succession, that 
have been in place since the early years of our constitutional system.18  
Therefore I see no constitutional infirmity in legislative succession.  And I 
relish the fact that, contrary to the so-called originalists’ arguments against 
the constitutionality of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, as 
Goldstein pointed out, the better originalist arguments are in favor of the 
constitutionality of legislative succession.19 
Let us turn to the question of the meaning of the word “Officer” in the 
Succession Clause of the Constitution.20  Article II, Section 1 empowers 
Congress, in the absence of a functioning President or Vice President, to 
declare “what Officer” shall act as President.21  I read this clause to mean 
simply that Congress is empowered to declare who shall act as President, 
that is, who shall succeed the President and Vice President.  Whoever 
Congress designates shall, by virtue of that fact, be an officer.  I realize that 
much ink has been spilled on the question of whether an “Officer” must be 
an “Officer of the United States,” and whether an “Officer” is a term of art 
referring to executive or judicial officers rather than legislative officers or 
indeed to only executive officers.22  I reject all of these arguments as driven 
by a misguided formalist conception of separation of powers. 
I want to focus on the language of the Constitution and to interpret it in 
light of the pragmatic, flexible scheme of separation of powers, together 
with checks and balances, established in our constitutional scheme.  We 
should read the Constitution to make sense as a matter of ordinary 
understanding.  And, we should avoid readings that construe ordinary 
language like “Officers” as terms of art.  If we take this pragmatic 
approach, we will not be driven to artificial conclusions like saying that 
“Officers” means only executive officers and that the Speaker of the House 
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate are not “Officers” in a 
constitutional sense.  An “Officer” is simply a person who holds an office.  
That would include the Speaker of the House and the President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate.  Indeed, an “Officer” could include the Governor of 
the most populous state (even if an “Officer of the United States” would 
not).  And it could include anyone named by the President to a group of 
advisors who would be in the line of succession (to be recommended 
below).  The fact that both Goldstein23 and John Feerick24 raise doubts 
 
 18. See Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886). 
 19. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1042–45. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 114–17; Calabresi, supra note 9, at 156–
67. 
 23. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1090–1113._ 
 24. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability:  Before and After the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 980–92 (2010). 
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about the conventional arguments against the Act’s constitutionality 
bolsters my judgment that it is not unconstitutional. 
As for the wisdom of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, I accord a 
considerable amount of deference to the judgment of pragmatic presidents 
(and former senators) like Harry Truman over the judgment of formalist law 
professors.  What is there to be said for the Presidential Succession Act of 
1947?  Truman said two things.  One, Truman did not believe that the 
President should have the power to choose his own successor, and therefore 
favored legislative succession over cabinet succession.25  That sounds 
sensible, to a point, though perhaps it sounds less sensible to us now than it 
seemed to him in 1947.  Nowadays, people are more enamored with the 
unitary executive and the imperial presidency than they were back in 1947.  
That may make people more comfortable today with the idea that the 
President should be able to choose his successor, and less comfortable with 
the idea of legislative succession.  And nowadays, the President to a greater 
degree chooses her own successor to begin with in selecting a vice 
presidential running mate; and so, perhaps, people would worry less about 
the fact that a President would be naming her own successor farther down 
the line through nominating a cabinet.  But, of course, the presidential 
nominee’s choice as a vice presidential running mate has to be confirmed 
by the delegates to the nominating convention and by the voters in the 
election. 
Two, Truman thought that the successors should be people who had been 
elected, rather than merely appointed, which argued for legislative 
succession over cabinet succession.26  Indeed, Truman argued that the 
Speaker of the House had a superior electoral pedigree to everyone other 
than the President and Vice President.27  Unlike many constitutional law 
scholars, I believe that there is eminent practical wisdom here.  Just as there 
is practical wisdom in the anecdote that when then-Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson boasted to Speaker Samuel T. Rayburn about President John 
Kennedy’s choosing “the best and the brightest” for his Cabinet, Rayburn 
supposedly said he would feel more comfortable “if just one of them had 
run for sheriff once.”28  Remarkably, some constitutional law scholars of 
today, like Calabresi, Akhil R. Amar, and Vikram D. Amar,29 suggest that 
cabinet officers have a greater democratic pedigree than do the leaders of 
the House and Senate!  They emphasize that the President is elected, and 
that the Senate advises and consents on presidential nominations for cabinet 
posts.  But I daresay that only a few law professors and champions of the 
unitary executive would say that this denotes that the Secretary of the 
 
 25. Special Message from President Harry S. Truman to the Congress on the Succession 
to the Presidency (June 19, 1945) [hereinafter Truman’s Special Message] (on file with the 
Fordham Law Review). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 39, 41 (1972). 
 29. Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 130; Calabresi, supra note 14, at 23, 31–33, 58–70. 
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Treasury enjoys a superior democratic pedigree to the Speaker of the 
House! 
I acknowledge that people today are more dubious about legislative 
succession because of the increasing prevalence of divided government, 
making more likely the prospect of a change in party control of the 
Presidency through legislative succession.  I also believe that people today 
are more dubious about legislative succession because they are more 
disparaging toward legislatures and legislators’ capabilities in general.  I 
have studied the disparagement of legislatures, and even organized a 
conference entitled The Most Disparaged Branch:  The Role of Congress in 
the Twenty-First Century.30 I have never seen such disparagement of 
Congress as in the literature on presidential succession!  Except perhaps at 
the Tea Party gatherings!  The only criticism I have of the Continuity of 
Government Commission Report is that it unfairly disparages the capacities 
of members of the House and Senate. 
Truman had a third idea—special elections—with the consequence that 
legislative succession would be only an interim measure, to be followed by 
the election of a President.31  Unfortunately, the Presidential Succession 
Act of 1947 did not adopt that proposal.  I advocate special elections below. 
Thus, I conclude that legislative succession under the Presidential 
Succession Act of 1947 is not unconstitutional and that the policy 
arguments in support of it are not as bad as is commonly thought.  Now I 
turn to minor, feasible changes I would propose. 
II.  PROPOSED MINOR, FEASIBLE CHANGES TO THE PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION ACT OF 1947 
I would tweak the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 with three minor, 
feasible changes, all of which would leave legislative succession in place, 
since I am assuming that Congress is unlikely to repeal this feature of the 
current arrangement.  One, I would change the legislative succession in a 
way that would avoid the potential transfer of power from one party to 
another:  (1) instead of the Speaker of the House, the successor would be 
the leader of the President’s party in the House (whether it be the Speaker 
of the House, the House Majority Leader, or the House Minority Leader) 
and (2) instead of President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the successor would 
be the leader of the President’s party in the Senate (whether it be the Senate 
Majority Leader or the Senate Minority Leader).  Both of these changes are 
more feasible than changing legislative succession to cabinet succession.  
And, both avoid a transfer of power from one party to another through 
legislative succession. 
Two, I would institute a vice Vice President or a body of successors 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  I think most 
commentators have given too short shrift to the idea of a vice Vice 
 
 30. See generally Symposium, The Most Disparaged Branch:  The Role of Congress in 
the Twenty-First Century, 89 B.U. L. REV. 331 (2009). 
 31. Truman’s Special Message, supra note 25. 
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President.  For a time, it was hard even to get highly capable people 
interested in the Vice Presidency.  For example, John Nance Garner, Vice 
President under Franklin Delano Roosevelt from 1933–1941, famously said 
the Vice Presidency was “not worth a pitcher of warm piss.”32  That has 
certainly changed,33 but it still might be difficult to get highly qualified 
people interested in a vice Vice Presidency. 
Who, you may ask, would want that office?  Well, for starters, any 
former President or Vice President who is physically and mentally capable 
of serving.  For example, William J. Clinton and Albert A. Gore could stand 
in the line of succession after Vice President Joseph R. Biden.  And George 
W. Bush and Richard B. Cheney could do so under a Republican 
Presidency.  I realize that questions of disability might arise with very 
senior former presidents and vice presidents (e.g., George H.W. Bush in 
advanced years or Ronald W. Reagan while he was alive but had 
Alzheimer’s).  I also acknowledge that questions of competence might arise 
in some instances, for example, some might worry about having Dan 
Quayle in the line of succession.  I also think it would be good for these 
successors to be interim or acting presidents, with a special election to 
follow soon. 
In my ideal line of succession, former presidents and vice presidents 
should come before either legislative leaders or cabinet members.  They 
have considerable relevant experience and knowledge.  They typically have 
not returned to elective office.  And some of them live and work in places 
outside Washington, D.C.  In my second-best line of succession, given the 
unlikelihood that Congress will give up legislative succession, former 
presidents and vice presidents would come after legislative leaders and 
before cabinet members. 
Another possibility I would embrace is an idea put forward by Goldstein, 
for Congress to “create a number of new ‘officers’” whose responsibility 
would be “simply [to] serve as wise men and women who would be briefed, 
who would be available to advise the President and serve as contingent 
successors.”34  The Continuity of Government Commission makes a similar 
recommendation.35  Both Goldstein and the Commission would place them 
after cabinet members in the line of succession.  I would place them before.  
I note that Goldstein and the Commission implicitly are assuming, as I do, 
that an “Officer” does not have to be a sitting federal executive or judicial 
officer.  I also would observe that Goldstein gives as examples not only 
former presidents and vice presidents but also elder statesmen like William 
W. Bradley, John C. Danforth, and Colin L. Powell.  Such people, I 
daresay, would be willing to serve as vice Vice President in this sense, or as 
officers in a body of contingent successors. 
 
 32. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, FDR 178 (2007) (citing Elliot A. Rosen, “Not Worth a Pitcher 
of Warm Piss”:  John Nance Garner as Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE:  THE 
VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 45, 45 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997)). 
 33. See generally Goldstein, supra note 8. 
 34. Id. at 1069. 
 35. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 1, at 45. 
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If we want people with executive experience in the line of succession, let 
us put the governors of the most populous five states in the line of 
succession, provided that they are of the same party as the President.  They 
also would have the benefit of living and working outside Washington, 
D.C.  Here, I should note that I disagree with the Amars that “Officers” 
must be “Officers of the United States,” which excludes state officials.  In 
any case, the President could name these governors to this body and as such 
they would be “Officers.” 
Finally, I would institute special elections, thus making all forms of 
succession (whether legislative, cabinet, or vice vice presidential) 
temporary.  This was the practice in the original statute, the Presidential 
Succession Act of 1792.36  Truman argued for special elections,37 as does 
the Continuity of Government Commission,38 and just about everyone else 
who has thought about the matter.  Everybody, that is, except the ones who 
have mattered thus far:  the Republican Congress that adopted the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947. 
 
 
 36. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, §10, 1 Stat. 239, 240–41 (repealed 1886). 
 37. Truman’s Special Message, supra note 25. 
 38. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMMIS’N, supra note 1, at 47. 
